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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GINO JOSEPH MONTOYA,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 960277-CA

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appealsfromconvictions of two counts of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995); one count of attempted aggravated
kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); and
three counts of kidnaping, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301
(1995), with gun enhancements on the three first degree felonies, in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding (R. 181-89, addendum
D).
The case having been poured over by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, this Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1995).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
and
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Where, pursuant to a plea bargain, the State dismissed ten counts and abandoned
all charges carrying minimum mandatory sentences, did the trial court reasonably impose
consecutive sentences for the six remaining counts as recommended by AP&P?
A reviewing court will "not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds that prescribed by law
or unless the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah
1986); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990); State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,
887-88 (Utah 1978). "An abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all
legally relevant factors' or if the sentence imposed is 'clearly excessive.'" State v. McCovey,
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted).
2. Did the trial court err by imposing unauthorized three-year firearm
enhancements?
"When the pertinent facts are undisputed," the legality of a sentence presents "a purely
legal question with respect to which the trial court has no discretion." State v. Brooks, 908
P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of this case requires application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1995) and
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1995), both reproduced in addendum A.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By second amended information dated 3 April 1995, defendant was charged as
follows:
Count I

Aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995);

Count II

Aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995);

Count III

Aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995);

Count IV

Aggravated kidnaping, afirstdegree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count V

Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count VI

Aggravated kidnaping, afirstdegree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count VII

Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count VIII

Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count IX

Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count X

Aggravated kidnaping, afirstdegree felony with ininimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count XI

Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony witii minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);
3

Count XII

Aggravated kidnaping, afirstdegree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count XIII

Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count XIV

Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count XV

Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995);

Count XVI

Possession of a dangerous weapon by restricted person, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995).

(R. 18-25, addendum B). All counts except XVI carried firearms enhancements (id.).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the following ten counts:
Count I
Count IV
Count V
Count IX
Count XI
Count XII
Count XIII
Count XIV
Count XV
Count XVI

Aggravated assault;
Aggravated kidnaping;
Aggravated kidnaping;
Aggravated kidnaping;
Aggravated kidnaping;
Aggravated kidnaping;
Aggravated kidnaping;
Aggravated kidnaping;
Aggravated kidnaping;
Possession of a dangerous weapon by restricted person.

(R. 168). The aggravated kidnaping charges carried minimum mandatory terms. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3) (1995). The State also reduced counts VII, VIII, and X from
aggravated kidnaping to kidnaping (compare R. 20-21 with 168). Finally, the State dismissed
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unrelated charges of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon by a restricted person
stemming from a reported carjacking in which defendant was the gunman (R. 249-50, 8a).
Defendant pled guilty to the following six counts:
Counts II
Count III
Count VI
Count VII
Count VIII

Aggravated robbery;
Aggravated robbery;
Attempted aggravated kidnaping;
Kidnaping;
Kidnaping;

Count X

Kidnaping.

(R. 167-68 [addendum C], 272-73, 280). None carried minimum mandatory terms.
Defendant was sentenced to statutory prison terms as follows: on each of the three first
degree felonies, for five years to life plus a 3-year weapons enhancement; on each of the
three second degree felonies, for one tofifteenyears (R. 181-89, addendum D). All sentences
were run consecutively (id.). Fines, surcharges, and restitution were also imposed (R. 181).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 197).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Crime1
By the time he was 22 years old, defendant had a "history of aggressive, criminal behavior
with the gang culture" (R. 16a). In fact, he was a "known, established leader" of the Varrio
1

Except as otherwise noted, this recitation of the facts is based on the factual basis
proffered by the prosecutor at the change of plea hearing, the Presentence Investigative
Report, and witness statements and the report of a defense psychologist annexed to that
report.
5

Loco Town gang (R. 25a). So when Officer Matthew Jewkes saw defendant drive past on
State Street in South Salt Lake, Jewkes wondered why defendant was not in jail or custody
(R. 258). Jewkes and defendant had met in the Utah State Prison, where Jewkes had been
a guard and defendant an inmate (R. 258, 2a). Jewkes followed defendant, visited with
him, and, after they parted company, performed a warrants check. The check disclosed
an outstanding $10,000 warrant for defendant's arrest (R. 2a).
Officer Jewkes later spotted defendant sitting on the steps of the Ritz bowling alley
(R. 3a). He approached defendant and said that he wanted to talk to him, to which defendant
replied, "fuck you" and started to run away (id.). Jewkes followed him and a struggled
ensued (id.). Defendant overpowered Jewkes and, after a "very violent struggle . . . for
several minutes" defendant succeeded in taking the officer's 9 mm semi-automatic pistol
(id., 16a). He pointed the gun at Jewkes' chest and head while demanding his radio (R.
3a). Defendant took the radio and ran to a nearby Wendy's restaurant (id.).
Defendant approached the car at the drive-through window, put the pistol to the driver's
face, and said, "let me in your car" (R. 50a, 53a). He pounded on her window, but she
locked her doors and rolled her windows half way up (R. 51a). When the girl at the window
told him to move, he turned around and pointed the gun at her (R. 52a). At that moment
another officer came around the corner and defendant ran away without responding to the
officer's order to drop the weapon (R. 3a).

6

Defendant ran to a nearby Taco Bell restaurant (R. 4a). He walked in the door, demanded
that everybody lie down on the floor and the doors be locked, and drew the gun (R. 57a).
Defendant ordered one of the hostages to try to reach defendant's girlfriend Jennifer by phone
(R. 59a). When he could not talk to Jennifer, defendant angrily fired a shot at the ceiling
(R. 60a). He told a police officer on the phone that "if he didn't get Jennifer inside the
store that he was going to shoot himself and everybody else" (R. 61a, 58a).
Defendant grabbed a female Taco Bell employee by the neck and pointed the gun at
her head (R. 4a, 60a). He "draggfed] her around" while trying to get all the employees
and customers to the floor (id.). She was "very scared" (R. 76a). Later he had the victims
form a circle around him "so that the officers outside the window could see that if he shot
himself he was going to take other people with him in the process" (R. 61a). He also had
two men sit on the counter to shield him from any police fire from outside the restaurant
(R. 68a). Then defendant fired a second shot through a window (R. 61a-62a, 4a).2
Several hostages were able to escape while defendant's attention was elsewhere (R.
4a). Several others went to the back door to shut it on defendant's orders; police urged
them to leave the building, but some refused, one stating that defendant had threatened to
"start killing people if she did not come back" (R. 4a). Nevertheless, police pulled three
hostages to safety from the back door (id.).
2

The court found that these shots were intentional and not accidental as defendant
claimed (R. 323).
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Police negotiated with defendant by telephone. After defendant was allowed to speak
to his mother and girlfriend by telephone and observe them from a distance, he agreed to
release the remaining hostages and surrendered to police (R. 4a).
Fifteen victims were involved in the incident, 12 of whom were held hostage inside
the Taco Bell for approximately three hours (R. 4a, 150a).
Sentencing Considerations
AP&P victim impact statements. Defendant's crimes have had serious impact on
many of his victims. One reports that the crime "dramatically impacted her life in a manner
that only time will help heal" (R. 10a). She feels paranoid and anxious when getting into
her car in parking lots and fears being car jacked (id.). Another reports feeling "mentally
scarred" and suffering ongoing nightmares and fear of retaliation (R. 1 la). Another writes
that "the fear of [defendant] on the street haunts me" (R. 12a). Another states that "she
had difficulty believing what was happening and when she wanted to runaway [sic] her feet
felt very soft as if they wouldn't work properly when she tried to run" (R. 15a).
Defendant's family background. Defendant was born and raised in Salt Lake City,
the oldest of three children (R. 23a). His parents divorced when he was 12 years old (R.
23a). Defendant was raised in a lower socio-economic environment with alcoholism and
criminal activity on both sides of his extended family (id.). "His upbringing was turbulent
at best, having been exposed to both physical and verbal abuse by his father and surrounded

8

by influences in which retaliation, substance abuse, and criminal activity were recurring
themes" (R. 30a).
Defendant told defense psychologist Vicki Gregory that he began smoking marijuana
at age 8 or 9, abusing inhalants between the ages of 10 and 13, drinking alcohol at age 12,
and using cocaine at age 16 (R. 107a).
Juvenile record. Defendant's juvenile record began in 1984, when he was 12 (R. 17a).
It features 29 referrals, including shoplifting, habitual truancy, destruction of property (nine
charges), aggravated assault, receiving stolen property, burglary, and theft (R. 17a-19a).
He was placed into "an intense supervision program designed for hardcore, repeat youth
offenders" (R. 21a).
Adult record. Defendant's adult record prior to the instant crime, spanningfromJune
1990 to September 1994, includes assault (guilty plea), vandalism (dismissed per plea bargain),
disturbing the peace (guilty plea), vehicle burglary, theft by receiving stolen property (pled
guilty to lesser offense), battery (served jail time), aggravated robbery (pled guiltytoattempted
robbery, a third degree felony), possession of stolen property, interfering with arrest, giving
false information, parole violations, burglary, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, supplying alcohol to a minor, and possession of a controlled substance (R. 19a-20a).
In March of 1991 defendant was sentenced to 0 to 5 years after pleading guilty to robbery,
a third degree felony (R. 22a). Paroled in May of 1992, defendant was arrested three months
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later for possession of a stolen firearm, consuming alcohol by a minor, interfering in an
arrest, and providing false information (id.). His parole was revoked (id.).
In August 1993 defendant was granted a second parole (id.). He was placed in a halfway
house on condition that he remain there until stabilized, complete the parol program, submit
to drug testing, complete mental health and substance abuse counseling, and refrain from
drug and alcohol use (id.). Thirteen days later defendant absconded. He was later arrested
and his parole revoked (id.).
In January of 1994 defendant was granted a third parole (R. 22a). His parole was adjudged
"substandard" because he failed to secure employment or participate in counseling as ordered,
but he did participate in gang education and awareness talks in the community (R. 23a).
His parole w&s terminated early, at which time his supervising agent wrote, "if Mr. Montoya
should come into the criminal system again in the future he should not be cut any slack due
to the fact he should know better because of his already having been in the probation and
parole system previously" (id.)
Gang affiliations. The bulk of defendant's criminal acts were "committed as an active
gang member, many with other gang members taking part" (R. 24a). He is a "known,
established leader" of the Varrio Loco Town (" VLT") gang, using the monikers "Sir Gino"
and "Sir Ray" (R. 25a). The gang is multi-generational, and was originally called "Montoyas
with Attitude" (id.).
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Before the present offense defendant showed some involvement in speaking out against
gangs, "but at the same time there was evidence within the gang unit the defendant was
still an active leader within VLT" (id.). Contrary to defendant's view, police concluded
that he "has had a negative, rather than positive impact upon younger gang members" (id.).
Mental health. Defendant "grew up in an anti-social environment and is very assaultive
as a result" (R. 26a). Coupled with his "difficulty in thinking and concentrating," defendant
shows "resentfulness, hostility, and aggressiveness" (id.). "His judgment is impaired and
he fails to profit from experience" (id.). Words used by mental health professionals to describe
defendant include anxious, pessimistic, apathetic, emotionally inhibited, maladaptive under
stress, argumentative, sarcastic, self-indulgent, shrewd, and deceitful (id.). But "no evidence
of serious mental illness has ever been discovered" (id.).
Defendant functions "within the dull to normal range of intellectual ability with an IQ
score of 81" (R. 26a). His performance on psychological tests administered by defense
psychologist Vicki Gregory involving word recognition, reading, and passage comprehension
are "consistent with a second grade level" (R. 110a).
Rehabilitation. While defense psychologist Vicki Gregory is optimistic that defendant
"has a substantial interest in making changes in his life and appears motivated for treatment,"
she concedes that "the combination of problemstiiathe is reporting suggests that treatment
is likely to be quite challenging," that defendant's "cognitive deficits will also make treatment
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difficult," and that defendant "lacks the verbal, language, and reading ability to benefit from
traditional insight-oriented therapy" (R. 116a).
In fact, the primary obstacle to progress appears to be defendant's lack of desire: "many
of the defendant's problems could be lessened if not eliminated were he able to withdraw
himselffromhis gang lifestyle and put forth a modicum of effort. Unfortunately, the defendant
has proven unwilling to make any such long term effort to date" (R. 26a).
The presentence report notes, "Because of his penchant for violence and aggressive
behavior the defendant had been referred for mental health counseling previously while under
supervision with Adult Probation and Parole but his attendance was lacking and no significant
progress was ever made" (R. 26a). His parole officer noted that defendant "failed to respond
genuinely" (R. 28a).
The presentence report concludes that although defendant "can articulate a commitment
to ending his involvement in the gang lifestyle and all its consequences he has never been
able to substantiate his reported commitment with sustained change" (R. 3la). It continues,
"Intervention has been attempted on the defendant's behalf in the juvenile system and early
in adulthood but he fails to respond" (id.).
Recommendations. Defense counsel conceded that defendant's history and crimes
"may warrant incarceration as a punitive sanction but she requested the terms run concurrendy".
in view of the fact that the crimes arise out of a single episode (R. 28a).
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The prosecutor recommended that all counts run consecutively (id.). The Salt Lake
Metro Gang Unit recommended "extended incarceration" (R. 25a).
Defendant's last supervising parole officer, Stuart Mclver, stated that defendant "was
given every opportunity, more than others, to succeed but failed to respond genuinely" (R.
28a). "When working one on one," he continued, "the defendant was compliant and receptive
to change but when he would be in his own surroundings with friends and family he was
a major concern and unable to follow through to any great degree" (id.); compare Br. of
Aplt. at 14, 15 (quoting only the words "compliant" and "receptive").
Defendant's grandmother insisted he has a "good heart," cf. Br. of Aplt. at 15 (quoting
words without attribution), but "a child's mind" (R. 29a). She reiterated her desire for him
to get help (id.). Defendant's mother's "primary concern" was that defendant not be housed
at the Utah State Prison, where his father and numerous cousins are incarcerated (R. 137a).
Defendant's former girlfriend described him as a "pretty good guy" and stated that
he was "scared of going back to prison and didn't know what to do" (R. 29a).
AP&P recommendation. The presentence report states, "In consideration of all factors
it is the consensus of Adult Probation and Parole [that] the defendant receive a lengthy period
of incarceration and [that he] is not deserving of the minimum term which would result if
all counts are applied concurrently. The community demands and the defendant's pattern
of aggressive criminal behavior justifies substantial consequences" (R. 31a).
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Accordingly, AP&P "recommended the three applicable firearm enhancements be applied
fully and that all counts run consecutive" (R. 32a).
Sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel made two major points.
First, she urged the court to sentence defendant to concurrent rather than consecutive sentences
(R. 299-300). She recognized that a prison term was to be expected (R. 297, 299). She
also conceded that much of the presentence information indicated that defendant was "hopeless"
and "what we should do is simply put him away forever" (R. 297). However, she relied
on statementsfromdefendant's girlfriend, his mother, andfromother individuals "that indicate
there is something within Gino that's worth considering" (R. 297-98).
She argued that defendant was "not a depraved, spiteful, hurtful individual who chooses
to prey upon the rest of us," as witnessed by the fact that he did not kill or physically injure
the hostages or other victims (R. 298-99). Counsel argued that by imposing concurrent
sentences the court would be "at least acknowledging the possibilities for this young man
to try to put it together" (R. 303, 300). Counsel mentioned defendant's "long history of
. . . learning disabilities" and that defendant "cannot read, he cannot write" and that he
"functions at a second grade level educationally" (R. 297, 303).
Second, defense counsel urged the court to recommend to the Board of Pardons that
they allow defendant to transfer out of the Utah State Prison, where his father and other
family members are housed, and be held out of state (R. 304).
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Defendant's mother spoke on his behalf, stating that defendant would never hurt his
victims, "so they shouldn't even be afraid any more, because he would have done it a long
time ago" (R. 306).
The District Attorney personally appeared and spoke in favor of consecutive sentences,
wondering rhetorically "how many times Mr. Montoya has heard these same admonitions,
how many times has counsel represented the same thing on different events, how many times
has he had the opportunity to be presented with facts and how many times has he said, I'll
straighten up" (R. 309). He also noted that defendant's actual incarceration time would
be determined by the Board of Pardons, whether the sentences ran concurrently or consecutively
(R. 312).
Two victims spoke. Thefirstdescribed herself as "okay" but traumatized. She continued:
"I go to work every day and it's like it reoccurs every day you walk in. I have a hard time
going out into my lobby every day . . . My establishment has still got us with a counselor.
It's still affecting my family life, my family, my kids" (R. 313-14). She also reported attempts
on her life: "Since he pleaded guilty in July, your Honor, I have had four attempts on my
life through my store that his gang has come in. They have now taken me out of my own
store for my protection. And basically I can't live this way" (R. 314). She reported "having
nightmares night after night after night" (R. 314).
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The second victim reported that she cannot go to Taco Bell or out on the streets after
dark, that she goes nowhere alone, that she cannot even drive herself places, that she cannot
sleep at night, and that she "still wake[s] up screaming" (R. 316). "But right now that's
not my worry," she continued; she worries more "because of his friends and family that
come in and threaten us at work" (R. 316-17).
Prior to pronouncing sentence, the court reviewed the facts of the case in detail (R.
322-27). It noted that defendant had "been shown leniency in this case by virtue of the plea"
bargain (R. 327), through which all charges carrying minimum mandatory sentences were
dismissed or reduced. With respect to the issue of consecutive sentences, the court stated:
"It appears to the Court that, in view of the past unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation and
supervision and probation and parole, and in light of all the other circumstances presented
to the Court, that it is just that those sentences all be consecutive to one another" (R. 328-29).
The court also stated that it would recommend to the Board of Pardons that, "if Mr.
Montoya is to have any chance of succeeding and actually changing his life," he would need
to be assigned to an alternative facility, not the Utah State Prison (R. 332).
The court asked counsel three times whether it had overlooked anything in sentencing
defendant (R. 330,331,333). Defense counsel never asserted that the court had inadequately
considered defendant's rehabilitative needs or otherwise abused its discretion (id.).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Defendant was charged with crimes carrying potential minimum mandatory sentences,
with firearm enhancements, of 192 years if run consecutively. In the plea bargain, the State
dismissed or reduced all charges carrying minimum mandatory terms. As a result, defendant
received three sentences of five to life and three sentences of one tofifteenyears, all running
consecutively. He argues that the court abused its discretion in not running the sentences
concurrently.
The court properly considered all factors, including defendant's purported "rehabilitative
needs." Defendant has a long history of gang-related violent crime. All previous attempts
at rehabilitation have failed as a result of his lack of effort. Even the defense psychologist
conceded that rehabilitation would be difficult.
The two cases upon which defendant relies, State v. Strunk and State v. Smith, are
inapposite. Those cases involved consecutive minimum mandatory terms of 24 years and
60 years respectively, depriving the Board of Pardons of any discretion to release Strunk
or Smith earlier. Here, by contrast, the Board of Pardons has complete discretion over the
actual length of defendant's incarceration. The court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel
all recognized this fact at sentencing.
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2. The court improperly imposed unauthorized three-year determinate firearm
enhancements on the threefirst-degreefelony convictions. This Court should remand with
directions to correct this inadvertent error.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
WHERE THE STATE DISMISSED TEN COUNTS, AND DISMISSED
OR REDUCED ALL CHARGES CARRYING MINIMUM
MANDATORY TERMS, THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY
IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON THE REMAINING SLX
CHARGES AS RECOMMENDED BY AP&P
Defendant claims that the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences without adequately considering defendant's rehabilitative
"needs." Br. of Aplt. at 16-17.
Defendant's potential mandatory sentence: 192 years. As a result of the plea
bargain, all charges carrying minimum mandatory terms were dismissed or reduced (R.
168). The prosecutor stated in chambers prior to the guilty plea that he was willing to
enter diis plea bargain because he "felt that with the six offenses to which Mr. Montoya
[was] pleading guilty, together with the firearms enhancements on die three First
Degree Felonies, . . . that there would not be a substantial difference of a possibility in
the amount of time he would be doing" (R. 250).
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Defendant was charged with twelve first degree felonies carrying minimum
mandatory terms of 5, 10, or 15 years (R. 18-25, addendum B). Conviction on these
charges would have resulted in aggregate minimum mandatory terms of 60, 120, or 180
years. Mandatory firearm enhancements would have added at least 12 consecutive
mandatory years, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) & (2) (1995), resulting in possible
consecutive sentences of between 72 and 192 years without possibility of parole.
At stake on appeal: 5 years. The difference between defendant's likely prison
time under consecutive and concurrent sentences here is not huge: probably less than
five years.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel reported her calculations of the likely
prison terms defendant would serve under concurrent sentences and under consecutive
sentences, based on AP&P's matrix (R. 300-01, 34a, addendum E). She correctly
calculated the predicted minimum term, without firearm enhancements, of 19^2 years
(10 years plus 114 months) if defendant were sentenced consecutively (R. 330-01, 34a,
addendum E). For concurrent sentences, the matrix predicts a prison term of 14 years
nine months (10 years plus 57 months) (see R. 34a, addendum E). This amounts to a
reduction of 57 months, or less than five years.3 Thus, as defense counsel accurately

3

The time attributable to two of the three first degree felonies would be reduced by
30 months (15 months each) and the time attributable to the three second degree
felonies would be reduced by 27 months (nine months each).
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noted at sentencing, "There is very little difference in many respects between the
consecutive and concurrent sentencing here" (R. 300).
Standard of review. A reviewing court will "not disturb a sentence unless it
exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused its discretion." State
v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); State v. Russell 791 P.2d 188, 192-93
(Utah 1990); State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). "An abuse of
discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors' or if the
sentence imposed is 'clearly excessive.'" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah
1990) (citations omitted).
Sentencing considerations. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (l)-(3) (1995) controls
the imposition of consecutive sentences. It provides:
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of
a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
The court here clearly considered "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" as required by this
statute. Defendant concedes that uthe gravity and circumstances of this case arguably
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weigh against concurrent sentences," although defendant would accord "minimal"
weight to this factor. Br. of Aplt. at 24. Defendant further concedes that "the trial
court for the most part acted within proper bounds in assessing Montoya's history and
character." Id. at 25.
With respect to defendant's rehabilitative needs, however, defendant asserts that
the sentencing court "failed to properly consider that factor." Id. He claims that he has
"special needs due to his learning and cognitive impairments . . . and is amenable to
treatment even though such a process might be difficult." Id. at 28.
The record is clear that defendant suffers from severe learning and cognitive
deficits. What is unclear is how that fact supports concurrent sentences. Defendant's
learning needs might be relevant if he had identified a particular program that could
address his mental impairments better than prison, but he has not done so. On the
contrary, defense counsel conceded that the decision before the court was not whether
to place defendant in prison or elsewhere, but how long to imprison him (R. 28a).
Defendant's learning and cognitive deficits might weigh in favor of a shorter
rather than a longer prison term if they were likely to speed rehabilitation, but again,
just the reverse is true. The defense psychologist wrote, "His cognitive deficits will
also make treatment difficult. Mr. Montoya lacks the verbal, language, and reading
ability to benefit from traditional insight-oriented therapy" (R. 116a).
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As for defendant's purported amenability to treatment, that claim rests primarily
upon his own self-serving statements to the defense psychologist, who found him
"motivated for treatment" (R. 116a). But even the defense psychologist, likely to offer
the rosiest possible prognosis, conceded that treatment was likely to be "quite
challenging" and "difficult" (R. 116a).
The sentencing court appeared to be more impressed with defendant's actual
history of rehabilitative efforts, which consists of a string of failures. The presentence
report concluded that although defendant can verbally commit to turn his life around,
"he has never been able to substantiate his reported commitment with sustained
change" (R. 31a). Prior attempts at mental health counseling under APifeP supervision
failed due to defendant's lack of attendance, with the result that "no significant progress
was ever made" (R. 26a). Defendant "failed to respond genuinely" (R. 28a) and "fails
to profit from experience" (R. 26a).
Defendant sees hope for rehabilitation in the belief that "[p]eople who have gotten
close to [defendant] have positive feelings about him and describe him as having a
'good heart.' R. 29a, 93a, 318-20." Br. of Aplt. at 27-28. The "good heart"
comment was made by only one person, defendant's grandmother {see R. 29a). R.
318-20 refers to a statement made at sentencing by Mark Montoya, defendant's ex-
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girlfriend's father (R. 318). He described defendant as "a pretty good guy" and "not
bad. He really is a caring person. He could be" (R. 319-20, emphasis added).4
In contrast, mental health professionals who have gotten close to defendant
describe him as resentful, hostile, aggressive, pessimistic, apathetic, emotionally
inhibited, maladaptive under stress, argumentative, sarcastic, self-indulgent, shrewd,
and deceitful (R. 26a).
The court adequately considered and weighed all factors.
Case law. The only cases cited in Point I of defendant's brief are State v. Smith,
909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), and State v. StrunK 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). However,
none of the factors informing these cases are present here.
Smith was convicted of aggravated kidnaping, rape of a child, and two counts of
sodomy on a child, all first degree felonies. Smith, 909 P.2d at 238. The sentencing
court stacked four 15-year minimum mandatory terms, resulting in a sixty-year
sentence without possibility of parole. Id. at 244. In a ruling "limited to the facts of
this case," the Utah Supreme Court held "it unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to
have imposed essentially a minimum mandatory life sentence and thereby deprive the
Board of Pardons of discretion to take into account defendant's future conduct and
possible progress toward rehabilitation." Id. at 245.
4

The remaining record page cited by defendant, R. 93a, was apparently cited in
error, as it does not pertain to this issue.
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In contrast, defendant here plea bargained away his minimum mandatory sentences
and may be paroled whenever the Board of Pardons, in its discretion, determines
appropriate. Defense counsel recognized this {see R. 302) ("Gino's life is going to be
determined through the control of the Board of Pardons and others"); the prosecutor
recognized this {see R. 312) ("the Board could keep him forever" or they could "kick
him up after five years"); and the sentencing court recognized it {see R. 328) (life
sentence "only possible if the Board of Pardons determines that that is appropriate").5
Moreover, the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences in Smith was
45 years; here the predicted difference is under five years.
Strunk pled guilty to first degree murder, child kidnaping, and aggravated sexual
abuse of a child. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1299. He was 16 years old at the time of the
offense. Id. He received a life sentence on the first degree murder, and consecutive
minimum mandatory sentences of 15 years for the child kidnaping and nine years for
the aggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 1299, 1301. The court remanded the
case because "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently consider

5

The court and counsel were legally correct. "Under Utah's sentencing scheme,
'the trial judge has no discretion in fixing the term of imprisonment. He or she simply
imposes the statutorily prescribed range of years, and the Board of Pardons determines
exactly how long the prisoner is to be confined.'" Rowlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958,
960 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 907
(Utah 1993)) (in turn quoting State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 563 (Utah 1987)
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting))).
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defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior
violent crimes." Id. at 1302.
The court went on to address Strunk's sentence. "By ordering Strunk's minimum
sentences . . . to run consecutive to each other, the trial court assured that Strunk
would spend a minimum of twenty-four years in prison before being eligible for
parole." Id. at 1301. The Court noted, "While imprisonment for that period of time,
or even longer, may prove to be necessary and appropriate, the twenty-four-year term
robs the Board of Pardons of anyflexibilityto parole Strunk sooner." Id.
Accordingly, the court directed that "if on remand the trial court again imposes the
longest minimum mandatory terms for these two offenses, all three terms should be
ordered to run concurrently to afford the Board of Pardons theflexibilityto adjust
Strunk's prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation and preparation to return to
society." Id. at 1302.
The controlling factors in Strunk were Strunk's "extreme youth," the "absence of
prior violent crimes," and the 24-year minimum mandatory sentence. None are present
here: defendant was a 22-year-old adult at the time of the crime; had a "history of
aggressive, criminal behavior with the gang culture"; and plea-bargained away all
minimum mandatory sentences (R. la-2a, 16a, 168).
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Strunk and Smith are best understood as departures from the general rule that
consecutive sentences are within the trial court's discretion. See Smith, 909 P.2d at
245 ("We do not mean to imply by this ruling that consecutive sentences are never
appropriate."); State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) ("Having determined
that the consecutive sentences are statutorily permissible, we find no abuse of discretion
by the trial court in their imposition in this case."). This is so where the terms are
mandatory, see State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) (upholding seventy-five years
of consecutive terms, including two minimum mandatory terms of fifteen years to life);
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (upholding two consecutive nineyear minimum mandatory sentences), and where they arise out of the same criminal
episode. State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Utah App. 1991); State v. O'Brien,
111 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1986).
* * *

By any measure, defendant's sentence is reasonable. It is reasonable compared to
the sentences facing defendant under the amended information. It is reasonable in view
of defendant's history of gang violence and unwillingness to rehabilitate. It is
reasonable in view of the harm suffered by defendant's many victims and defendant's
future dangerousness. Consecutive sentences were recommended by Adult Probation
and Parole and, indeed, by everyone except defendant's counsel and his mother. The
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court did not abuse its discretion, but acted within the "limits of reasonableness," State
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992), in imposing consecutive prison terms.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING UNAUTHORIZED
THREE-YEAR FIREARM ENHANCEMENTS
This Court should correct what appears to be an inadvertent error made by the trial
court in imposing firearm enhancements.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1995), if the trier of factfindsa dangerous weapon
was used in the commission of afirst-degreefelony, "the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently."
If afirearmis used, an enhancement of at least one year must be imposed: a a mandatory
one-year minimum enhancement sentence must be imposed for use of a firearm in cases
involvingfirstand second degree felonies." State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1984).
However, the court's discretion is limited: "the statute requires that the trial court choose
between a determinate one-year sentence or an indeterminate sentence of one tofiveyears."
State v. Beltran-Felix, No. 950341-CA, slip op. at 14 (Utah App. July 5, 1996); State v.
Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989).
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Here, defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of
attempted aggravated kidnaping, all first degree felonies (R. 181-86, addendum D). He
used a firearm in committing these crimes (R. 258-59). On each count, the court properly
imposed a firearm enhancement, but erroneously specified a determinate term of three years
{see R. 182, 184, 186, addendum D).
This Court "may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner,
at any time," Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1995),
even if the sentence is "unlawfully lenient." State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991),
cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 883 (1992). It should do so here, remanding with directions to
impose a firearm enhancement of either a determinate term of one year or an indeterminate
term of "more than one year but not more than five years," Willett, 694 P.2d at 603, on
the three first-degree felony counts.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's consecutive sentences should be affirmed; the case should be remanded
to the district court for correction of the unauthorized firearm enhancements on the three
first-degree felony counts.
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION
Oral argument would not significandy aid the decisional process in this case. The first
issue on appeal borders on frivolous, and the second is undisputed. A published opinion
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is desirable, but would contribute incrementally rather than substantially to the body of Utah
case law.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1995). Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence
that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. However, this limitation does not apply
if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction.
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they
shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has
been committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed
prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the maximum
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into
the greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences are equal and
concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with the most recent conviction constituting
the time to be served.
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed,
but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1995). Felony conviction - Indeterminate term of
imprisonment - Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than five years,
unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier
of fact finds a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the representation of a dangerous
weapon, as provided in Section 76-1-601, was used in the commission or furtherance
of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally
sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to
run consecutively and not concurrently.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: R. YBARRA
Assigned to: R. BLAYLOCK

Plaintiff,
BAIL: $250,000.00

AMENDED
INFORMATION

-vsGINO JOSEPH MONTOYA,
DOB 6/9/72
OTN 7436884

Case No. 951002280FS
Honorable Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

The undersigned Roger S. Blaylock - Deputy District Attorney, under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant, committed the crimes of:
COUNTI
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 146 East Wentworth , in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, assaulted Matthew Jewkes, by the use of a
dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or
the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Assault, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
COUNT II
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 146 East Wentworth, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal
property in the possession of Matthew Jewkes from the person or immediate presence of
Matthew Jewkes, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use
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of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun and/or caused serious bodily injury to Matthew
Jewkes; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation of a
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery, giving
rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended
COUNT III
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 2185 South State Street, in Salt Lake
.
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
^
\
Section
302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
A
v
^
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal
7
property in the possession of Jennifer Hansen from the person or immediate presence of
Jennifer Hansen, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use „
of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun and/or caused serious bodily injury to Jennifer
Hansen; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation of a
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery, giving
rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended.
COUNT IV
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Edward Johnson, seize, with the intent use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony; or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
COUNTV
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Robert Crites, seize, with the intent use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
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commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
U^OUNTVI
^AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
* \ V \ JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
A ) authority of law, and against the will of Glenda Fullmer, seize, with the intent use as a
(o*
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony; or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;

i#i

( /

COUNT VII
AGQRAVAiED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Angela Hendrickson, seize, with the intent use as
a hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that afirearmor a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;

$6

COUNT VIII
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
c \ \ A X JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
t /^
— authority of law, and against the will of Troy Davis, seize, with the intent use as a
v-/
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
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commission of a felony, or flight from a felony; or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
COUNT IX
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Todd Ellis, seize, with the intent to use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
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COUNTX
AOQRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
\VAX
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
(
v )
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
NT
authority of law, and against the will of Tim Bohlen, seize, with the intent to use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;

W

COUNT XI
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Ebelio Mares, seize, with the intent to use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
COUNT XII
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3,1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Cheryl Tucker, seize, with the intent to use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
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COUNT XIII
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Jolene Jackson, seize, with the intent to use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
COUNT XIV
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Arturo Mares, seize, with the intent to use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
COUNT XV
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without
authority of law, and against the will of Patsy Bendixen, seize, with the intent to use as a
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
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COUNT XVI
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second Degree
Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about
February 3,1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 503, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the
offense, did have in his possession a dangerous weapon, to-wit: firearm while on parole
or probation for a felony.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Michael Fierro, Gregg Carlson, Matthew Jewkes, Mike McNaughton, Mike Hoffman,
Patrick J. Kryger, Janaye A. Johnson, Edward Johnson, Robert Crites, Glenda Fullmer,
Angela Hendrickson, Troy Davis, Todd Ellis, Tim Bohlen, Karen Roberts, Elesa Capulin,
Ebelio Mares, Cheryl Tucker, Jolene Jackson, Arturo Mares, Elionso Mares, Patsy
Bendixen, Jennifer Hansen, Steven Mallett and Steve Daniels.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant, a South Salt Lake City Police detective, bases this information on their
reports, Case No. 95-20134, which he has read, and his personal investigation, which disclosed
the following:
1.
The report of Officer Matthew Jewkes of the South Salt Lake City Police
Department to the effect that on February 3,1995, at 146 East Wentworth, South Salt Lake City,
Utah, upon taking the defendant into custody on an arrest for outstanding warrants, the defendant
engaged Officer Jewkes in a violent struggle and overpowered him. The defendant managed to
gain control of Officer Jewkes' Glock 9mm semiautomatic pistol and held it to Officer Jewkes'
chest then to his head and demanded that Officer Jewkes' give him his police radio. The
defendant then fled.
2.
The oral and written statements of Ms. Jennifer Hansen to the effect that on
February 3, 1995, while she was at the drive-up window at the Wendy's restaurant located at
2185 South State Street, South Salt Lake City, Utah, the defendant approached with a gun and a
hand-held radio in his hands and pointed the gun at Ms. Hansen and said, "Get out of the car!"
twice. At that time a police officer (Mike McNaughton) approached, and the defendant fled.
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3.
The report of Officer McNaughton of the South Salt Lake City Police Department
to the effect that on February 3,1995, at the above-described Wendy's restaurant, he observed the
defendant at Ms. Hansen's automobile pointing the gun at her, and when he gave chase, the
defendant fled to the Taco Bell restaurant located at 2161 South State Street, South Salt Lake
City, where he entered and took hostage at gun point fifteen customers and employees for a
period of two and a half hours.
4.
The oral and written statements of fifteen customers and employees of the abovementioned Taco Bell restaurant, to the effect that the defendant entered the restaurant, told them
to get on the floor and that, during the course of the hostage situation, he threatened that he was
going to kill all fifteen people and himself. Twice during the situation, the defendant fired the
gun.
5.
A review of the defendant's Utah Criminal History discloses that he has formerly
been convicted of the crime of Attempted Robbery, a cprfje of violence, in the Utah Third
District Court.

ROGEK S. BLAYLOCK

ibscribed and sworn to before me this
'day of April, 1995.

MAGISTRATE
Authorized for presentment and filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, District Attorney

>eputy-Oistrict Attorney
amended/March 31,1995
msy/95 001427
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE

STATE OF UTAH,

Date:

JULY 12, 1995

vs.

Case No:

951900533

GINO JOSEPH MONTOYA,

Judge:

ANNE M. STIRBA

Defendant.

Clerk:

MRT

(Jail)

Reporter: SUZANNE WARNICK

Plaintiff,

FS

CHANGE OF PLEA
This case is before the court for CHANGE OF PLEA on the charges
of
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGG KIDNAPPING
AGG KIDNAPPING
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON
Appearing for the State is ROGER BLAYLOCK.

(Third Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
Appearing as counsel

for the defendant is CANDICE A JOHNSON.
The court grants the defendant's motion to withdraw the
defendant's plea of not guilty.

ooem

Case Number: 951900533 FS
The defendant waives the reading of the information.
After the court examined the defendant, the defendant enters a
plea of guilty to:
(2)
(3)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(10)

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
ATT AGG KIDNAPPING
KIDNAPPING
KIDNAPPING
KIDNAPPING

(First Degree Felony)
# ^J^First Degree Felony)
^x^t[Soeen&
Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)

The court orders counts 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
dismissed.
The defendant is advised of his/her rights.
The defendant waives the right to be sentenced at the time
prescribed by statute, and sentencing is set for:
EVENT: SENTENCING
DATE : SEPTEMBER 14, 1995
TIME : 9:00 AM

ADDRESS: METRO. HALL OF JUSTICE
240 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111

PLACE: ROOM 3 04

JUDGE

: ANNE M. STIRBA

The defendant is referred for a Pre-sentence Investigation report
from ADULT PROBATION & PAROLE.

ADULT PROBATION & PAROLE is notified.

The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of
County Sheriff.
Also appearing for the defendant is Patrick Anderson.

Also appearing

for the State are Neil Gunnarson and Walter Ellett.
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, 8ENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

QStfflOS^

Case No.
Count No.
Honorabl9 r-L *rtrvp- M, :Sbrfe*a
Clerk
*TKornf,
Reporter
y\|(irnirirr
Bailiff j ^ - .
Date
fhS

vs.

Defendant.

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; # plea of guilty;
D plea ofpo contest; of the offense of ft^fl T % d b h f f r ^ |
, a felony
of the I ^ deg/ef, p a class
misderrtBatior, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
. and the State being representedby
I N» (^f\ftarfr<f\ is now adjudged guilty
represented byrC/fl E^ftf
se,
lsnow
sentenced
to
a
term
in
the
Utah
State
Prison:
of the above offense
D
D
D
)S
D
V
tf

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
^
*
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of %2(?00 " p 6 u s GS% S U r c J o ^ ^ e .
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of %JJWL~L t n " f a y R>il f\Ui<.

Cilftc^vsr* -for a\\

\iicM**s

frotji^irng

.

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
% such sentence is to run consecutively with €&fJr\ CPurv4D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

ftfW 4 W U$P. St>
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
(o
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Q Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
*CCJU)\£
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned
imprisoned in
in accordance
accordance with
with this
this JJudgment and Commitment.
and
(4 Commitment shall issue T ^ r 4 ^ W i 4 * \
DATED this

H^cday of

645ftrb»rV\Krr9 $<£

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel
Page J.

Deputy County Attorney
'VAHAM^jAji/PnaaA/APAPt

IP**—OtyfonM)

(Gold*nrod—Stat*)

of ?
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O"1^
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
Based upon the plea of the defendant, the defendant's admissions in open court, and the charge contained in the
Information, the Court finds that the defendant used a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm in
the commission or furtherance of the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty;
Judge's

W^

m

^"

and it is orde^c^hat the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a
term Bfof 5A^yel§&runot to exceed five years, as provided by law for the use of a firearm or
facsimile or the representation of a firearm in the commission or furtherance of the offense of
which the defendant has been adjudged guilty. Such sentence shall run consecutively and
not concurrently with the basic sentence set forth above.

HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon finding that the defendant is in the status of a habitual criminal, the defendanat is sentenced to:
D not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison.
DATED this / t P 3 ^

d a y of

f>^^m\ryr-

, 19 ? S "

.

Page <r

of —L
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, 8ENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

Case No.
Count No. _ 3 L
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter i». Wat
Bailiff
,
\Cy
hie.

vs.

C3g.il

Date

Defendant.

SS
I2L~.

^gprrsmber / 4 , /<W<r

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is O granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
joefl conv
should not be imposed, and defendant baving beeq
convicted by D a jury; D the court; t& plea of guilty;
., a felony
D plea qfjno contest; of the offense of nO&
Koho St.
in court and ready for sentence and
of the l - ^ * degree,.• a class
misderrreanior, being now present
resent inc
, and the State being representedi bbyy &
i vJ L
IJlUirYSavSSfl
is now adjudged guilty
represented
*
offense;
rsnow
s
sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
of the above

f

D
D
D
2d
D
D
O

years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
^
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
to

o ^1<?7

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
_
JS such sentence is to run consecutively with g f l r i k r<OUift*r
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)
are hereby dismissed.
D
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County G for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
M Commitment shall issue
DATED this

/ Tday of JS&2A&£^9

3£

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel
Page J_of_2_

Deputy County Attorney
—_I..M~.*

< v ^ . * « _ ima/DriMA/ApftPi

(Pink—Defamal

(GokfcnroO— SUtt)
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ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
Based upon the plea of the defendant, the defendant's admissions in open court, and the charge contained in the
Information, the Court finds that the defendant used a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm in
the commission or furtherance of the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty;
Judge's

y

,n,t

j?W

*w

p nfo^flf

and it is orgeredJfianiie defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a
term fcof^S^ye^orunot to exceed five years, as provided by law for the use of a firearm or
facsimile or the representation of a firearm in the commission or furtherance of the offense of
which the defendant has been adjudged guilty. Such sentence shall run consecutively and
not concurrently with the basic sentence set forth above.

HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon finding that the defendant is in the status of a habitual criminal, the defendanat is sentenced to:
D not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison.
DATED this

l

1

^

day of

^gpkmbe^

, 19

fUL

GL^oo

Page
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JUDGEMENT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

.

vs.

(^iAn^Wj\k
^

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

ModmU
v

\JCX\\

.

I

Case No.

\
(

Honorable ffiflvy^M. 5 ^ V ^ g |
cierk
rv-n hprr\g

1

Reporter 6 • ]Nar rtclc
Bailiff
Y~ (Vig.
Date—5tnp^rV\i^r H , l ^ f

Defendant.

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having b$en convicted by D a jury; D the court; &p)ea of guilty;
D plea ofpo contest; of the offense of r \ 4 l — n ^ a — K I a » r \ Q p p l i r v ^
, a felony
of t h * | y rtpgrpe, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present inucoufTand ready for sentence and
represented by ^ Twvf^Srx ' a n d t h e S t a t e b e j n 9 represented by M Qj4iyyQir!SorNs now adjudged guilty
of the above offehse?1s^owsentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
Rf of not less than five years and which may be for life;
^
D not to exceed
years;
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
D such sentence is to run concurrently with
_
K such sentence is to run consecutively with CO^k CoUfeVr
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)
D _

^
^ 0 ^

~-n
1& I

are hereby dismissed.

_

O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
a Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or G for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
J& Commitment shall issue * * ^ - m u ^ < 4 h — _
j^<i oft
DATED this / i d a y o f

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^ttfrtldwCW

3f?

V^J^HK^VQ V

x-^

1

12

JT<^Z^i
LLS^XJ

Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney

Page

000185

ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
Based upon the plea of the defendant, the defendant's admissions in open court, and the charge contained in the
Information, the Court finds that the defendant used a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm in
the commission or furtherance of the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty;
Judge's
Initials
and it is oc^edUiatthe defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a
term J5of W y r a r ^ o r u not to exceed five years, as provided by law for the use of a firearm or
facsimile or the representation of a firearm in the commission or furtherance of the offense of
which the defendant has been adjudged guilty. Such sentence shall run consecutively and
not concurrently with the basic sentence set forth above.

HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon finding that the defendant is in the status of a habitual criminal, the defendanat is sentenced to:
D not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison.
DATED this

/ 4 ^ . day of

Ck^m

DISTRICT COURT J

Page

&

of — - f
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, 8ENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

Case No.
Count No. J 3
Honorable

vs.

cierk
Reporter
Bailiff

fA. ;Thnrr#
f^- Wfirflfclr.
,—

|1inu

Defendant.

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; l&plea of guilty;
( contest; of the offense of r%>t>f\nftplw^
D plea of no
. a felony
nor, beingiYow present in court and ready for sentence and
of the ££%L degree, D a class
misdemeanor
represented h y < \ ^ ^ i w / \
, and the State being represented by N- nunMtrsnr\ is now adjudged guilty
>f
tehsferfif^owsentenced
to a term in the Utah State Prison:
of the above of

U

D
O
H
O
D
D
D

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $to

2.^0 2.1 ?7

O such sentence is to run concurrently with
GgUh,4
Sf such sentence is to run consecutively with CAcK
a upon motion of o State, O Defense, D Court, Count(s)
are hereby dismissed.
D
a Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or O for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
$f Commitment shall issue
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney
(White-Court)

(Or^n—Jodot) (YtHow—Jalt/Pnton/APftP) (Ptnk—Ottentt) (GoMtnrod—State)

Page
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, 8ENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

Count No. J&.

j-

Honorable A w ^ l V t •Sfryka
Clerk
N T -Thorns
Reporter
Bailiff _
Date

Defendant.

£*- WarKTd'

ZEE
E- life

phwtw^ IT; l ^ r

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is G granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court; &plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of K l r i r v ^ p p l ^
, a felony
of the **J2^
degree,
a
a
class
misdemeanor,
being
now
present
mcoi
^L^Tdegree, •
jq court and ready for sentence and
a n d t h e S t a t e bein
Mi/Yi)rsnr\ is now adjudged guilty
represented K Y ^ C b ^ ^ ^
9 represented byN- $Lti\\
of the above offehreTfrfi^w sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
a
yi
O
D
D
O

years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
to

Z2-0

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
H such sentence is to run consecutively with ( V K J U Clou
D upon motion of O State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

2.^01

are hereby dismissed.

D

D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
tti Commitment shall issue
DATED this / * f cday
i of
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COUR
Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney
(WhKt-Court) (G«Mfl-Judg*) (Y««ow-J*W»i»on/AP»P) (W«*-Ot«in««) (OoManreO-Statt)

Page
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff.

N

vs.
f^tAn Gra>epk

JUDGMENT, 8ENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

KorvVDi|q

I

Case No.

\

Honorable P^fiC> W> ^>4ifta
Clerk
fA.^fKorrtf'.
Reporter ^7
Wf\rr\\<?lrr
Bailiff
j kL. Jvj
lv/t£
Date
g > a p W E w y N} \qpur

<Scc\
Defendant

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; IS plea of guilty;
O plea of no contest; of the offense of i v
, a felony
of the .SL^degree, D a class
misdemeanor, beincfnow present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by fc ^fcfy^pjfl t and the State being represented by /v(3uftrcx^6fl i s n o w adjudged guilty
of the above offfcri&rtsfrotf'sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
J^T of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
-2- ^0
O of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
a and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
•
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
D such sentence is to run concurrently with
BT such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

^
~n
*2- [ V I

are hereby dismissed.

D

D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or O for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
y^ToT/^^
$ Commitment shall issue
DATED this / 7

day of

>fl)fcrnkr, 19 351

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
fMCTDl/^T

^/"U»lf
DISTRICT COURT
Jl

Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney
(Whttt—Court) (Grwrt—Judg*) (V«Mow—J«M/Pritoci/AP*P) (Pir*-D«tont*) (GoW»«cod—Strtt)
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ADDENDUM E

Mhinn

TIME

CRIME SEVERITY
CAPITAL

MISDEMEANORS
1ST DEGREE
.
PERSON CRIMES
. OTHER CRIMES
MURII
OTHER HOMICIDE 2ND DEG 3RD DEG 2ND DEG 3RD DEG
A
B
|2NDSEX
3RD SEX
|

•

>
O

POOR

CO

12YRS

yoYlss

6YRS

36MON

24 MON

24 MON

18 MON

12 MON

6 MON

1

10YRS

7YRS

5YRS

30MON

21 MON

21 MON

15 MON

10 MON

5 MON

1

7YRS

5YRS

4YRS

24MON

18 MON

18 MON

12 MON

8 MON

4 MON

1

5YRS

5YRS

3YRS

21 MON

15 MON

15 MON

9 MON

4 MON

3 MON

1

5YRS

5YRS

2YRS

18MON

12 MON

12 MON

6 MON

3 MON

3 MON

1

v ^ ^ ^ i
CONS5CUTIVEENHANCEMENTS —
j j p a t f t ^ 24 MON j 1 ^ » g ^ J 12 MON 112 MON

6 MON

3 MON

3 MON

CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS ADDED BY B.O.P.
1
3 MON
15 MON I 12 MON I 9 MON 1 6 MON j 6 MON | 3 MON

3MON

z
<

i

FAIR

o
MODERATE

GOOD

EXCELLEN

36 MON

|
18 MON

DRUG DISTRIBUTION OF OR INTENT TO DIST. OVER $500 & RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY SHOULD BE -PERSON" CRIMES

ACTIVE
MOST SERIOUS

0©N¥10TI©NS

t) A/U, & A r W 7 U

DEGREE

YEARS

I

lo

NEXT MOST SERIOUS*lML 'feflfte**!
OTHER
i)kH ALL\£x***+Pt±/~
OTHER
H-6J) £ t t t , W > A i < V
fecov^s)
&

t~3 X o c U > o c

£v«t.«fVU"\.

^U

^ '

MONTHS

J2M
6

^ A L JO Jfe

SENTENCES SHOULD GENERALLY BE CONCURRENT. HOWEVER, THE EXISTENCE
OF THE FOLLOWING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST CONSIDERATION
OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES:
1. ESCAPE OR FUGITIVE
ff/UNDER SUPERVISION OR BAIL RELEASE WHEN OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED
T . UNUSUAL VICTIM VUNERABILITY
4. INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY LOSS WAS EXTREME FOR CRIME CATEGORY
5. OFFENSE CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREME CRUELTY OR DEPRAVITY
IF THE SENTENCES ARE TO BE CONSECUTIVE, USE THE CONSECUTIVE ENCHANEMENTS
PORTION OF THE TIME MATRIX" FOR ALL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES EXCEPT THE
"MOST SERIOUS" CONVICTION.
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